









































In recent years, the price and income elasticity of fuel demand in South Africa has featured
prominently in energy and competition policy proceedings and in major corporate planning
projects. The paper investigates the price and income elasticity of gasoline (petrol), diesel and
jet fuel demand in South Africa. Such a study is essential, given the signiﬁcant structural
change in fuel consumption behaviour over the 1990s and the paper builds compare the results
of econometric models based on a longer sample period covering 1982Q1 to 2010Q4 and a
shorter sample period covering 1998Q1 to 2010Q4. The econometric model is based on an
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model, reduced to a parsimonious speciﬁcation using an
automated reduction algorithm.
JEL classiﬁcation C22 R41
Keywords gasoline petrol diesel jet fuel price elasticity income elasticity South Africa bounds
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
South African fuel prices have featured prominently in the news media for over a decade, with geopo-
litical uncertainties and a volatile exchange rate resulting in high and variable crude oil prices. These
price developments have altered fuel consumption behaviour among some consumers and producers,
although many producers (including farmers) note the diﬃculties of reducing their demand without
hampering production (Fofana, Chitiga et al. 2009). On the other hand, strong economic growth,
especially in the years preceding the ﬁnancial crisis, has placed signiﬁcant pressure on South African
fuel reﬁneries (Merven, Hughes et al. 2010). Therefore, local policymakers and the petroleum in-
dustry are keenly interested in understanding the determinants and evolution of South African fuel
demand. This interest has grown signiﬁcantly over the past two years, driven by the need for ac-
curate price and income elasticity estimates as inputs in policy decisions (including fuel pipeline
tariﬀs) and long-run planning for large infrastructure projects (see discussion below). In addition,
policymakers and industry are increasingly interested in the eﬀects of greener and more eﬃcient fuel
technologies on fuel demand. This paper studies price and income elasticity of gasoline (petrol),
diesel fuel, and jet fuel demand in South Africa, with special emphasis on structural changes in
demand patterns since the late 1990s.
The paper ﬁrst considers recent developments related to South African fuel demand, in order to
locate the rationale and speciﬁc contributions of the paper. This is followed by a review of extant
South African literature, an exposition of the econometric methodology and data, and a presentation
of model results and conclusions.
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12R a t i o n a l e
The primary motivation for this paper is the need for accurate estimates of price and income elasticity
of fuel demand in South African policy proceedings. Speciﬁcally, over the last ﬁve years, price and
income elasticity has featured prominently in energy policy and competition policy. A secondary
motivation for the paper is the importance of these estimates in corporate planning at petroleum
companies and ﬁnancial institutions. The following sub-sections outline important instances where
price and income elasticity estimates have featured prominently in recent years.
2.1 Energy policy
The price and income elasticity of fuel demand in South Africa were the focal points in the 2009/2010
pipeline tariﬀ determination hearings of the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA).
Transnet, the state-owned transport conglomerate, owns and operates the Durban-Johannesburg
pipeline (DJP). The pipeline, constructed in 1965, feeds the so-called “in-land”1 fuel region of South
Africa, which includes Gauteng, North-West, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, the Free State, as well as parts
of the Northern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. While Transnet owns the DJP, as well as other pipelines,
the government regulates pipeline tariﬀs (Swart 2010). Speciﬁcally, since 1 November 2005, NERSA
regulates petroleum pipeline tariﬀs.
In 2007, NERSA granted Transnet a construction license for the New Multi Product Pipeline
(NMPP), which will signiﬁcantly raise future supply capacity to the in-land region. Transnet aimed
to fund the construction of the NMPP by applying to NERSA for higher tariﬀso nt h eD J P( N a -
tional Energy Regulator of South Africa 2010). This resulted in a high-proﬁle legal battle between
Transnet and the petroleum companies using the DJP. Petroleum companies with coastal reﬁneries,
but wanting to compete in the inland market, utilize the DJP and pay the pipeline tariﬀst om o v e
their fuels inland. Other petroleum companies, including Sasol, with inland reﬁneries do not face
similar costs. Given that retail fuel prices are regulated, pipeline tariﬀ increases would imply a sig-
niﬁcant comparative disadvantage for the petroleum companies with coastal reﬁneries. In fact, some
estimates put the total “windfall” for petroleum companies with inland facilities at around R1.7
billion (Creamer 2009). Companies with coastal reﬁneries subsequently disputed whether pipeline
tariﬀ setting should account for construction costs of new pipelines. Nevertheless, even if these
costs are to be incorporated, it was the size of the tariﬀ adjustment that proved to be particularly
contentious. Speciﬁcally, in 2009, Transnet requested at 73.5% average tariﬀ adjustment for the
2010/2011 ﬁnancial year and also signalled that increases of a similar magnitude would be required
for the subsequent four years (Transnet 2008). This was a sharp deviation from the 8% tariﬀ ad-
justments originally projected by Transnet and the company argued that the sharp rise was due to
the particularly negative economic outlook at the time — which depressed fuel demand: lower fuel
quantities reduced the total tariﬀ revenue and it was necessary to raise the tariﬀ in order to raise
overall revenue. Pipeline tariﬀs form part of the retail price of fuel and a 73.5% rise would have
translated into a 21 cents per litre increase (Transnet 2008). Petroleum companies with coastal
reﬁneries disputed this ﬁgure on a number of grounds, including inconsistency with international
pipeline tariﬀ-setting practices. Another source of contention — of particular importance to this
paper — is that petroleum companies questioned Transnet’s overly pessimistic forecasts of future fuel
demand: the tariﬀ methodology employed by NERSA allows for a retrospective compensation in fu-
ture tariﬀs based on the extent to which projected and actual fuel volumes have diverged. Petroleum
companies with coastal reﬁneries argued that Transnet’s volume forecasts are driven by pessimistic
economic growth and (to a lesser extent) high oil price assumptions. These companies consequently
1The Main Supply Agreement (MSA) of 1954, concluded among South African petroleum companies, divided the
country into two main fuel supply regions: the “in-land” region supplied exclusively by Sasol and the “coastal” region
supplied by the coastal reﬁneries (Swart 2010). Although the MSA was terminated in 2003, these deﬁnitions continue
to be used widely in the industry.
2generated their own volume forecasts, using alternative price and income scenarios, which suggested
higher rather than lower fuel demand volumes. NERSA ultimately rejected the Transnet applica-
tion, although, more recently, it has approved higher tariﬀs (National Energy Regulator of South
Africa 2010).
2.2 Competition policy
In 2005, the Competition Tribunal evaluated a proposed merger between Sasol Oil and Engen to form
a new merged entity Uhambo. The legal proceedings included testimony by a number of competition
economists working for various petroleum companies and government. An important part of the
proceedings concerned the extent to which Uhambo would enjoy market power in the in-land region
and the consequent likelihood of it using this power to foreclose the in-land region to competitors.
The limited pipeline capacity at the time implied that petroleum companies without in-land reﬁneries
were still dependent on Uhambo reﬁneries — and would become increasingly dependent depending on
the growth rate of inland volumes (Theron 2008). Therefore, price and income elasticity estimates
and forecasts featured centrally in the case: higher growth rates in the in-land volumes would create
supply constraints and foreclosure risk more quickly.
Not surprisingly, forecasts of inland and coastal fuel demand growth among the diﬀerent parties
diverged sharply: Table 1 presented earlier contains a summary of the elasticity estimates provided
by various parties. The Tribunal rejected the merger in 2006 (Competition Tribunal 2006). The
Tribunal was critical of the demand estimates provided by the merging parties, but also questioned
the statistical soundness of the models presented to it by intervening parties. In general, price and
income elasticity remains central to the analysis of competition issues in the petroleum industry,
especially until the logistical constraints due to insuﬃcient pipeline capacity is fully addressed.
2.3 Corporate planning
Estimates of price and income elasticity of fuel demand are also used extensively in the petroleum
industry itself, where especially long-run fuel scenarios (based on various income and price assump-
tions) have featured prominently in corporate planning in recent years. The need for an accurate
assessment of price and income as drivers of South African fuel demand is driven by two factors.
Firstly, as mentioned, the development of further pipelines from Durban to Gauteng requires signiﬁ-
cant storage infrastructure investment to house the transported fuel in Gauteng. Informal estimates,
based on the author’s own involvement in these projects, suggest capital values exceeding R1 bil-
lion. Similarly, reﬁnery infrastructure investments at the coast also depend critically on estimates
of expected price elasticity and income elasticity. Demand models are therefore critical inputs into
investment planning processes. Secondly, there is signiﬁcant demand for a re-assessment of price
and income elasticity of fuel demand in light of the impact of eﬃciency changes and new technology
on the demand for fuel. In this regard there are also South African-speciﬁc questions relating to, for
example, the taxi-recapitalization programme and its eﬀects on demand.
The above examples demonstrate the need for accurate income and price elasticity estimates
in policy proceedings and corporate planning and highlight the signiﬁcant uncertainty surrounding
these estimates. The following section summarizes existing research on fuel demand and identiﬁes
some of the reasons for existing estimates being less useful to policymakers and corporate planners.
3 Literature review
The literature on energy demand models distinguishes between theory-driven and empirically-driven
approaches to demand modelling. Empirically-driven approaches cover a range of statistical and
econometric models. Statistical models include autoregressive speciﬁcations and crude smoothing
procedures and appear to outperform more sophisticated econometric and theoretical models in
3forecasting (Li, Rose et al. 2010). However, econometric models are useful for policy analysis
and retrospective analysis. Econometric models of fuel demand boast a range of methods, including
application of the recent bounds-testing approach developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) — De
Vita, Endresen and Hunt (2006) and Akinboade, Ziramba and Kumo (2008) are applications in the
Southern African context. Nevertheless, even newer econometric models face challenges in dealing
with structural change, a feature likely to be increasingly important in decades to come. Theoretical
approaches, such as the partial adjustment model, have been applied recently to allow for changes in
habits and structural breaks (Breunig and Gisz 2009). The models also seem promising, but appear
to be less useful for forecasting purposes.
Academic research on fuel demand in South Africa is surprisingly scarce. However, Theron (2008)
provides a useful summary of recent private-sector estimates, to which we add some additional results
from the academic literature, as shown in Table 1. The price elasticity estimates for gasoline demand
are generally around -0.5 and for diesel demand around -0.1. Income elasticity of gasoline demand
are estimated at 0.4 (with the exception of one estimate of 1.0) while the income elasticity of diesel
appears to be above 1.0.
T h em o r er e c e n te s t i m a t e si nT a b l e1s h o wv e r yl i t t l ed i ﬀerence from the ﬁrst formal results in
Cloete and Smit (1988). However, a number of factors suggest that fuel consumption behaviour
has changed over the past two decades. Firstly, and most important of all, gasoline volumes grew
rapidly in the 1990s but growth slowed down signiﬁcantly in the 1990s; in contrast, diesel volume
growth accelerated signiﬁcantly since the late 1990s (see data discussion below). Secondly, electricity
problems have boosted demand for alternative power sources, including diesel generators — which
would aﬀect the relationship between income and fuel volumes (see Spalding-Fecher and Matibe
(2003) for an earlier summary). Thirdly, consumers become more price-sensitive over time: even
price-inelastic demand will, over time, become more elastic. Modelling fuel demand over a very
long period, and obtaining an average long-run relationship over this period, may not be a desirable
approach. Econometrically speaking one may ﬁnd an average relationship (especially if change
occurs slowly), but such a relationship would bear no relation to current behaviour. Fourthly,
previous research tends to rely on annual fuel data. However, in the author’s experience in working
with the petroleum industry, there is increased interest in, ﬁrstly, the impact of seasonal changes and,
secondly, the short-run sensitivity of volumes. These features are important for planning purposes.
Fifthly, current academic research focuses mostly on gasoline volumes, and there is a need for a formal
assessment of diesel and jet fuel volumes in addition to gasoline. The latter has not received any
attention in previous economic research, despite the signiﬁcant implications for travelling resulting
from inadequate jet fuel supplies, such as that experienced in August 2009 (South African Petroleum
Industry Association 2010).
We therefore re-investigate South African fuel demand to study the potential impact of structural
changes by using a more recent shorter sample period of a quarterly frequency.
4M e t h o d o l o g y
The paper employs the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model proposed by Pesaran et al.
(2001) to model fuel demand, coupled with an automated general-to-speciﬁc (GETS) reduction











where, in period t, Qt is log fuel sales, Pt is log fuel price, Yt is log income, Zt is a vector of
dummy variables dealing with data outliers, and {ε} are assumed a serially uncorrelated series.
The ARDL model is a single-equation approach to modelling short- and long-run relationships
among variables (Pesaran, Shin et al. 1996; Pesaran 1997). Endogeneity problems traditionally lead
4econometricians to favour a multivariate systems approach over single-equation approaches when
studying long-run relationships. However, estimation and inference from the single-equation ARDL
model is still valid provided a suﬃcient lag structure is employed. The technique has therefore
gained signiﬁcant popularity, also in demand modelling.
A fundamental assumption accompanying the use of an ARDL model is that of a unique long-run
relationship among , and and the ARDL model oﬀers a way of testing whether a unique long-run
relationship can be found, as discussed below. Furthermore, the ARDL model can be applied
regardless of the order of integration of the variables — avoiding the pre-testing problem faced by
conventional cointegration tests.
After developing a general ARDL speciﬁcation, we inspect whether the model is congruent with
both data and theory: we investigate whether the signs of diﬀerent parameter estimates are consistent
with the predictions from theory (for example, overall negative sign for price elasticity and positive
sign for income elasticity) and then run a batch of misspeciﬁcation and diagnostic tests on the
residuals ˆ εt (including tests for normality, heteroscedasticity, remaining autocorrelation and the
Ramsey RESET test for speciﬁcation error). If these tests are passed, the model is labelled the
general unrestricted model (GUM).
The GUM is not a parsimonious model and may contain, for example, irrelevant lagged variables
that may contaminate the long-run parameter estimates and lead to a less robust model. Conse-
quently, we employ an automated GETS search algorithm to reduce the GUM to a speciﬁcm o d e l
(Campos, Ericsson et al. 2005). The algorithm chooses a number of starting points and, for each
path, employs a step-wise reduction strategy to omit statistically insigniﬁcant variables provided
information loss is limited (information loss is measured by change in the maximized log-likelihood
value). The results of the multiple paths are then uniﬁed in a single model, on which the same
step-wise reduction procedure is repeated until the model arrives at a single parsimonious model —
known as the speciﬁc model (Hendry and Krolzig 2001).
The speciﬁc model allows us, ﬁrstly, to test for the existence of a unique long-run relationship
and, secondly, to derive long-run elasticity estimates. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) show that
α1 = α2 = α3 =0a test for the existence of a long-run relationship involves testing the hypothesis
that against two-sided alternatives. These authors then suggests a bounds test approach, according
to which the F-statistic is compared to two critical bounds, an upper value associated with the
condition where all of P, Q and Y are I(1), i.e. contain unit roots, and a lower value where all of P,
Q and Y are I(0), i.e. are stationary. Values falling below the lower boundary indicate the absence
of a systematic relationship, while values exceeding the upper boundary conﬁrm such a relationship.
Where the test statistic falls between the two critical values, it is necessary to test for unit roots in
the individual series. If the series are all integrated, the upper bound is the critical value. Where all
series are found stationary, the lower bound is the critical value. For a combination of stationary and
non-stationary variables the test is inconclusive if the test statistic falls between the critical bounds.
The latter is not common and the bounds test approach therefore avoids (or, at least, signiﬁcantly
reduces) the need for pre-testing the series for unit roots.
Pesaran et al. (2001) report asymptotic critical values for the bounds test. However, Turner
(2006) shows that ﬁnite-sample critical values are necessary in practice, as asymptotic critical values
can be biased even for relatively large samples of 300 observations. Therefore, using an approach
similar to that employed by Pesaran et al., Narayan (2005) generates critical values for sample sizes
of 30 to 80. This paper compares results for the Pesaran et al and Narayan critical values, given the
relatively small number of observations.
Once the existence of a long-run relationship is established, it is straightforward to calculate







The parameter estimate ˆ α1 is the so-called speed of adjustment parameter, if all series are non-
stationary: it shows the speed at which the ∆Qt will respond to any long-run disequilibria. For
example, if the speed of adjustment parameter is small the long run plays a less important role in
the quarter-to-quarter behaviour of fuel consumption and short-run factors may be more important.
5D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
5.1 Variables and data sources
The ﬁrst step in economic modelling is the identiﬁcation of the parameters of interest and the
collection of data on variables that will enable estimates of these parameters. In general, the demand
for any good depends on various factors, including its own price, income, and prices of substitutes
and complements. The literature has also emphasized the importance of accounting for a plethora of
additional demand-shift factors, including preferences, technology and institutional change. While
all these variables would provide a rich model of fuel demand, the empirical estimation of such a
function is challenging. Speciﬁcally, accounting for changes in the underlying tastes and preferences
of consumers as well as for changes in the institutional environment is a diﬃcult task. This paper
improves on current research by considering a shorter quarterly dataset that may be less exposed to
structural breaks, while continuing to focus on price and income forces due to data constraints.
Table 2 reports the data sources used in the econometric analysis. Note that the South African
Petroleum Industry Association (SAPIA) only provides volume data until 2008. This followed
competition concerns relating to the exchange of volume data among petroleum companies (see,
for example, Das Nair and Mncube (2009)). Data for the last two years were obtained from an
independent expert, who has collated information from various companies for other purposes. The
technique used to construct the data follows the usual methodology employed by SAPIA and is
directly comparable.
As far as prices are concerned, we use the real retail price of gasoline and diesel fuel and the real
oil price in South African currency (rand) for jet fuel (we do not have actual jet fuel prices available).
For income, we use real disposable income for gasoline and real gross domestic product (GDP) for
diesel fuel and jet fuel. The diﬀerence is motivated from previous South African research, which ﬁnd
a better ﬁt for disposable income than GDP in gasoline demand functions (Theron 2008). Before
proceeding to the formal modelling, we present a brief descriptive analysis of the fuel consumption
data in order to highlight structural breaks.
5.2 Structural breaks
This study is motivated by the need to reassess price and income elasticity on the basis of a more
recent and quarterly dataset that is less prone to structural breaks than longer and annual data
employed by previous researchers. Figure 1 reports gasoline and diesel fuel volumes for the period
1982 to 2010.
Figure 1 suggests a structural break around 1998 in gasoline volumes: before 1998 a strong
time trend is visible, but none after 1998. At around the same time, diesel fuel volumes appear to
accelerate strongly relative to the previous sideways movement. In Figure 2, jet fuel volumes behave
similarly (although we only have data available from 1994 onwards): volumes experience strong
growth up to around 1998 but subdued growth subsequently. These structural changes motivate
demand models for gasoline and diesel fuel based on both the entire sample period from 1982Q1-
2010Q4 and a shorter sample period of 1998Q1-2010Q4. Jet fuel is modelled only for 1998Q1-2009Q3
due to data constraints. The longer sample period provides a standard against which to assess earlier
estimates, while the shorter recent sample period provides an indication of how elasticity estimates
6may have changed in recent years. Of course, the graphical impressions of structural change are
merely indicative and in the discussion of the model results we employ formal breakpoint tests to
highlight structural change.
5.3 Graphical relationships
Figures 3, 4 and 5 graph gasoline, diesel and jet fuel volumes relative to the real price of each fuel.
While the relationship between price and gasoline volumes may be clear for the ﬁrst two decades,
the bivariate relationship becomes quite murky from 2000 onwards. The same holds for diesel and
jet fuel. In general, however, the data suggests a negative relationship, which is consistent with
previous ﬁndings.
The relationship between fuel volumes and income is seen graphically in Figure 6, which shows
clearly the positive long-run relationship between the various fuel types and real disposable income
(a similar graph is obtained when using real GDP).
6R e s u l t s
This section presents the regression results for the diﬀerent ARDL demand models. The ARDL
results depend critically on the choice of lag structure. We use the Akaike and Schwarz information
criteria to select optimal starting lag lengths. These metrics suggest a lag order of four for the
gasoline and jet fuel models, twelve for the diesel model based on the longer sample period and
seven for the diesel model over the shorter sample period. The speciﬁcm o d e l st h a te m e r g ef r o mt h e
GETS reduction process usually contain only lags of a ﬁrst or second order, which suggests that the
starting lag lengths are not restrictive.
As argued, our approach involves, ﬁrstly, generating a GUM and, secondly, a speciﬁcm o d e l .H e r e
we only present the speciﬁc model results. In each case, the GUM passed all data misspeciﬁcation
tests and was found congruent with theory. The results are available upon request. The regression
results is then followed by misspeciﬁcation tests, graphs related to parameter stability, then the
bounds test results and ﬁnally a table reporting the long-run estimates of price and income elasticity.
6.1 Gasoline
The GUM for gasoline demand for the shorter and longer sample period is ﬁrst used to detect
structural change. Structural change is assessed using Chow (1960) tests for parameter constancy
(see, for example, Hendry and Nielsen (2007: 195-197)). The break-point Chow test aims to test
whether the model speciﬁcation ﬁtted on a sample period ending at is able to predict all of the
remaining data points, for every feasible . Figure 7 reports the graphical results for the gasoline
GUM:
While the ﬁgure evaluates the test statistic at a 10% critical value, the p-values for the period
1996 to 1998 are between 4.85% to 8.8%. These suggest signiﬁcant structural change in this period,
conﬁrming the need for a separate model based on a shorter sample period.
Table 4 present the gasoline demand models for both the longer and shorter sample periods.
A range of misspeciﬁcation tests, reported in Table 5, conﬁrm the adequacy of both models at a
5% signiﬁcance level. However, as expected, the model based on the longer sample period fails
the RESET, which likely picks up the impact of a structural break on the functional form of the
regression.
It is possible to further investigate the stability of the two gasoline demand models using recursive
estimation: this method estimates the same model on smaller sub-sample periods to assess the
stability of the parameter estimates. Figure 3 reports recursive parameter estimates for price and
income elasticity for the model based on the longer sample period.
7Figure 8 suggests signiﬁcant instability in both parameters during the mid-1980s and stability
afterwards. Figure 9 replicates the exercise for the gasoline model based on the more recent shorter
sample period and conﬁrms that this model produces more robust parameter estimates. Therefore,
even if results are similar for the two models, we are less certain about the results for the longer
sample period. Put diﬀerently, one should be careful of using a single demand model spanning a
long sample period, as is the practice in previous South African fuel demand research.
If one is willing to accept both speciﬁc models, one may proceed to the bounds test. Table 6
shows the results, conﬁrming a signiﬁcant long-run relationship for both sample periods.
Given conﬁrmation of a long-run relationship, Table 7 reports estimates for the parameters in
the long-run relationship. The suggested long-run price elasticity estimate from both models are
around -0.55, while the long-run income elasticity is estimated at around 0.8 (see Table 7). Following
Akinboade et al. (2008) we estimate standard errors using Bardsen (1989).
Although our price elasticity estimates for gasoline demand correspond with those obtained by
Akinboade et al. (2008), it is not clear whether the result indicates unchanged consumer behaviour
or whether the correspondence is due to chance because of parameter instability. We also ﬁnd
signiﬁcantly higher income elasticity in both our sample periods, which suggests that consumption
of gasoline is actually much more sensitive to the consumer’s ﬁnancial position. While some previous
studies also ﬁnd high income elasticity, none of these studies look closely at the problem of structural
change and the problem of relying on a long sample period.
Finally, the speed-of-adjustment parameter for both demand models is around 0.2 (see Table
4), which implies that it takes about ﬁve quarters for a long-run disequilibrium to be corrected.
This speed is quite diﬀerent from the speed suggested by previous annual data models of about ﬁve
years (Akinboade, Ziramba et al. 2008). Such a protracted response is not intuitive, as is evident
from simply comparing quarterly fuel consumption and price. We therefore argue that our gasoline
demand estimates oﬀer an improvement over current research.
6.2 Diesel fuel
We follow a similar approach to estimate the demand function for diesel fuel in South Africa, de-
v e l o p i n gam o d e lb a s e do nb o t ht h el o n g e ra n ds h o r t e rs a m p l ep e r i o d . A sw i t ht h eg a s o l i n e ,t h i s
approach is conﬁrmed by Chow (1960) breakpoint tests, reported in Figure 6.
The break in diesel demand appears to be more pronounced than that for gasoline demand. In
fact, even after including dummy variables to account for extreme outliers, we do not succeed in
identifying a unique long-run relationship for the 1982Q1-2010Q4 sample period. As argued earlier,
the ARDL only allows for a single long-run relationship: ﬁnding none may yet imply that there
are two relationships — perhaps due to structural change. In fact, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant long-run
relationship for the 1998Q1-2010Q4 period; the GUM for this period is congruent with data and
theory, showing signs consistent with theory and passing all misspeciﬁcation tests.
Despite the unsatisfactory results for the longer-sample GUM we also report the speciﬁcm o d e l
derived from this GUM. As noted, the longer-period GUM’s problems carry over into its speciﬁc
model, which includes no long-run component. We therefore focus mostly on the 1998Q1-2010Q4
speciﬁcm o d e l :
Table 9 conﬁrms the adequacy of the speciﬁc model for 1998Q1-2010Q4 and highlights some of
the problems of the longer period speciﬁc model (notice, for example, the p-value for the RESET
test, which is an indicator of structural change). The problems are likely the result of the signiﬁcant
change in behaviour of diesel fuel consumption during the mid 1990s — a period included in the
longer sample period (refer back to Figure 1).
Figure 11 reports recursive estimation results for the speciﬁcm o d e lb a s e do nt h es h o r t e rs a m p l e
period. The ﬁgure suggests that the estimates are fairly stable. Although conﬁdence intervals in
2000 and 2001 are wide, these are the result of the very short subsample periods over which the ﬁrst
recursive estimates are derived and the graph shows subsequent estimates to be very stable.
8Only the model based on the more recent sample period passes the bounds test, as shown in
Table 10, suggesting a signiﬁcant long-run relationship between diesel fuel price, income and diesel
fuel consumption over this period.
Table 11 reports the long-run elasticity estimates suggested by the shorter sample period. De-
mand elasticities for the shorter period speciﬁc model is estimated at around -0.2 for price and 1.5
for income. These results are consistent with previo u sd i e s e lf u e ld e m a n de s t imates for South Africa
of about -0.1 for price and 1.4 for income (refer to Table 1).
Although research on diesel fuel demand in South Africa is not ubiquitous our diesel fuel results
appear to be consistent with previous ﬁndings. Speciﬁcally, the results highlight the signiﬁcant role
of economic growth in driving demand for diesel fuel in South Africa, much stronger than for gasoline.
Furthermore, even if one takes the diesel model over the longer period to be merely indicative, a case
can be made that economic growth remains the most important driver of diesel fuel consumption.
6.3 Jet fuel
Jet fuel consumption data is more limited than gasoline or diesel fuel data and are only available
from 1994Q1. We estimate jet fuel demand for 1998Q1-2009Q3 to retain comparability with the
other models. We ﬁnd the GUM to be congruent with data and theory and subsequently derive
the speciﬁc model using the GETS automated procedure. The regression results for the speciﬁc
model are reported in Table 12 and show a very simple speciﬁcation, which includes only the lagged
dependent variable in addition to the long-run variables.
The speciﬁc model appears to pass all of the diagnostic tests as shown in Table 13:
The recursive results suggest that the model produces extremely stable parameter estimates for
long-run price and income elasticity, as shown in Figure 8.
Given the stability of the speciﬁc model, we perform the bounds test and ﬁnds evidence of a
statistically signiﬁcant long-run relationship at a 5% critical level, as shown in Table 14:
Similar to the diesel fuel demand, the speciﬁc model suggests that jet fuel demand has a fairly
low long-run price elasticity of around -0.1 and an income elasticity of about 0.9, as shown in Table
15:
In general, the jet fuel demand function suggests that economic growth, rather than oil prices,
is determinative for jet fuel sales in South Africa. In addition, the speciﬁc ARDL model indicates
a very high speed-of-adjustment parameter (-0.68, see Table 12), which suggests that any long-run
disequilibrium is corrected within less than two quarters. The long run relationship, therefore, plays
as i g n i ﬁcant role in quarter-to-quarter consumption changes in South African jet fuel demand.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The results from the demand models for gasoline, diesel fuel and jet fuel presented in this paper
can be summarized as follows. Firstly, the results for the gasoline models are consistent with earlier
estimates. To be sure, this research ﬁnds higher point estimates for long-run price and income
elasticity: we ﬁnd price elasticity estimates of -0.59 for the shorter sample period compared to -0.44
for the longer period; for income elasticity we ﬁnd 0.82 compared to 0.67. However, once standard
error bands are taken into account, we do not ﬁnd statistical evidence of a signiﬁcant mean diﬀerence.
In addition, we also ﬁnd a higher speed-of-adjustment point estimate (-0.3 compared to -0.2), but
there are no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences. However, what is interesting is that the speed-of-
adjustment estimate for both the longer and shorter periods is signiﬁcantly faster than suggested by
other research: -0.2 suggests 5 quarters for long-run equilibrium to be restored, which contrasts with
ﬁndings of around two years based on annual data (see Akinboade et al. (2008)). These results shed
led on the impact of price and income volatility on gasoline volumes. Gasoline demand is slowly
becoming more sensitive to price and income changes, but much of the volatility in gasoline fuel
9sales are due to volatility in underlying price and income rather than greater sensitivity to these
drivers.
Secondly, the results suggest important new ﬁndings for diesel demand. We do not ﬁnd evidence
of a unique long-run relationship between diesel volumes, price and income over the longer sample
period. This does not indicate that such a relationship do not exist, as there may have been structural
changes to this relationship. This is conﬁrmed by the signiﬁcant long-run relationship uncovered
over the shorter sample period. The long-run price elasticity suggested by this relationship is -0.21
compared to around -0.1 suggested in previous (and not publicly available) research (refer back to
Table 1). Standard error conﬁdence intervals do not suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerences. However, we
do ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant higher income elasticity for diesel demand. This is not surprising,
given the strong relationship between diesel demand and economic growth in recent years. For
the ﬁrst time, speed-of-adjustment estimates are obtained for diesel: the -0.48 estimate suggests
that disequilibria are corrected within two quarters, which is much quicker than for petroleum. In
fact, the rapid equilibrium-adjustment estimates for gasoline and diesel fuel suggest that long-run
equilibrium adjustment is an important factor in the short-run behaviour of gasoline and diesel fuel
demand — lending credence to the focus on long-run estimates in this paper.
Thirdly, the paper presents the ﬁrst price and income elasticity estimates for jet fuel demand.
Long-run price elasticity is estimated at -0.1 and income elasticity at 1.0 for the period 1998Q4-
2009Q3. Speed-of-adjustment is very fast: less than 1 quarter.
In general, the demand models presented in this paper shed new light on emerging fuel demand
patterns in South Africa. There are slow increases to be seen in price and income elasticity of gasoline
demand, while our models suggest much higher income elasticity for diesel demand. Furthermore,
adjustment to long-run disequilibrium occurs much quicker than previous research suggests. The
paper also estimates jet fuel price and income elasticity, showing that income elasticity is much
higher than price elasticity.
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12Table 1: Estimates of price and income elasticity of South African fuel demand 
 
Authors  Sample period  Price elasticity  Income elasticity 
Cloete and Smit 
(1988) 
1970-1983  -0.24 (gasoline, short-term) 
-0.37 (gasoline, long-term) 
0.43 (gasoline) 
Bureau  for  Economic 
Research (2003) 
n.a.-2003  -0.21 (gasoline, short-term) 
-0.51 (gasoline, long-term) 
-0.18 (diesel, short-term) 
-0.06 (diesel, long-term) 
n.a. 
Akinboade et al (2008)  1978-2005  -0.47 (gasoline, long-term)  0.36 (gasoline, long-term) 
Theron (2008) summary of 
BER model 
1984-2004  -0.19 (gasoline, short-term) 
-0.62 (gasoline, long-term) 
-0.1 (diesel, long-term) 
0.1 (gasoline, short-term) 
1.0 (gasoline, long-term) 
1.36 (diesel, long-term) 
Theron (2008) summary of 
Econometrix model 







Table 2: Variables and data sources 
 
Variable  Source  Description 
Gasoline sales  South  African  Petroleum 
Industry  Association  (SAPIA) 
(up to 2008), industry sources 
Petrol sales in millions of litre, 1982Q1-2010Q4 
Diesel fuel sales  SAPIA  (up  to  2008),  industry 
sources 
Diesel sales in millions of litre, 1982Q1-2010Q4 
Jet fuel sales  SAPIA  (up  to  2008),  industry 
sources 
Jet fuel sales in millions of litre, 1994Q1-2009Q3 
Gasoline price  SAPIA  Retail coastal pump price of 95 octane petrol in Rand, 
1982Q1-2010Q4 
Diesel price  SAPIA  Retail  coastal  pump  price  of  0.05%  sulphur  diesel  in 
Rand, 1982Q1-2010Q4 
Oil price  South  African  Reserve  Bank 
(SARB) 
Quarterly Brent crude oil (spot) in US dollars 
(data series KBP5344M), 1980Q3-2010Q4 
General price level  SARB  Private consumption deflator, base year 2005, 1982Q1-
2010Q4,  calculated  from  nominal  and  real  private 
consumption  expenditure  (data  series  KBP6007D  and 
KBP6007L) 
Income  SARB  Household disposable income in millions of Rand, base 
year 2005 (data series KBP6246L), 1982Q1-2010Q4 
Real  gross  domestic product  in millions of  Rand,  base 
year 2005 (data series KBP6006D), 1982Q1-2010Q4 
Rand  dollar  exchange 
rate 





   
13Table 4: Specific models for gasoline demand (dependent variable  ) 
 
1982Q1-2010Q4  1998Q1-2010Q4 
Regressor  Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Regressor  Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
  -0.29 (0.07)     
  0.14 (0.06)     
  -0.23 (0.02)    -0.22 (0.04) 
  0.21 (0.06)    0.52 (0.24) 
       
  -0.19 (0.04)    -0.30 (0.11) 
  -0.11 (0.02)    -0.13 (0.03) 
  0.16 (0.03)    0.20 (0.06) 




Table 5: Misspecification tests for gasoline demand models 
 
  1982Q1-2010Q4  1998Q1-2010Q4 
Test name  Test statistic (probability)  Test statistic (probability) 
AR (1-4) test  1.69 (0.14)  1.56 (0.21) 
ARCH (1-4) test  0.96 (0.43)  0.82 (0.52) 
Normality test  1.16 (0.56)  0.67 (0.72) 
Heteroscedasticity test  0.71 (0.79)  0.79 (0.67) 




Table 6: Bounds test results for gasoline demand models 
 
Sample period  F-statistic  10% critical bounds 
    Lower bound ( )  Upper bound ( ) 
1982Q1-2010Q4  11.25**  3.17 (asymptotic)  4.14 (asymptotic) 
1998Q1-2010Q4  5.00** 
#  3.17 (asymptotic)  4.14 (asymptotic) 
    3.33 (finite)  4.31 (finite) 




Table 7: Long-run elasticities of gasoline demand 
 
Sample period  Price elasticity (standard error)  Income elasticity (standard error) 
1982Q1-2010Q4  -0.44 (0.04)  0.67 (0.04) 
1998Q1-2010Q4  -0.59 (0.13)  0.82 (0.16) 
 
 
   
14Table 8: Specific models for diesel fuel demand (dependent variable  ) 
 
1983Q2-2010Q4  1998Q1-2010Q4 
Regressor  Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Regressor  Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
  -0.66 (0.07)    -0.40 (0.09) 
  -0.31 (0.05)     
      0.09 (0.06) 
  -0.09 (0.04)     
  0.11 (0.04)     
  -0.13 (0.04)    -0.26 (0.04) 
  -0.17 (0.03)     
  -0.08 (0.03)     
      0.21 (0.03) 
  3.26 (0.32)    5.61 (0.79) 
      -2.99 (0.75) 
      3.10 (0.60) 
  1.36 (0.29)     
      -1.35 (0.51) 
  1.35 (0.34)     
  -1.16 (0.35)     
      -0.48 (0.11) 
      -0.10 (0.03) 
      0.75 (0.16) 




Table 9: Misspecification tests for diesel fuel demand specific models 
 
  1983Q2-2010Q4  1998Q1-2010Q4 
Test name  Test statistic (probability)  Test statistic (probability) 
AR (1-4) test  1.46 (0.21)  0.97 (0.44) 
ARCH (1-4) test  1.17 (0.33)  0.47 (0.76) 
Normality test  3.61 (0.16)  3.27 (0.20) 
Heteroscedasticity test  1.14 (0.32)  0.58 (0.91) 




Table 10: Bounds test results for diesel fuel demand models 
 
Sample period  F-statistic  10% critical bounds 
    Lower bound ( )  Upper bound ( ) 
1983Q2-2010Q4  0.88  3.17 (asymptotic)  4.14 (asymptotic) 
1998Q1-2010Q4  9.17** 
#  3.17 (asymptotic)  4.14 (asymptotic) 





   
15Table 11: Long-run elasticities of diesel fuel demand 
 
Sample period  Price elasticity (standard error)  Income elasticity (standard error) 




Table 12: Specific models for jet fuel demand (dependent variable  ) 
 
Regressor  Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
  0.11 (0.03) 
  -0.68 (0.08) 
  -0.08 (0.01) 
  0.68 (0.08) 




Table 13: Misspecification tests for jet fuel demand specific models 
 
Test name  Test statistic (probability) 
AR (1-4) test  2.44 (0.07) 
ARCH (1-4) test  0.36 (0.84) 
Normality test  1.82 (0.40) 
Heteroscedasticity test  0.94 (0.51) 




Table 14: Bounds test results for jet fuel demand models 
 
Sample period  F-statistic  10% critical bounds 
    Lower bound ( )  Upper bound ( ) 
1998Q1-2009Q3  35.03**  3.17 (asymptotic)  4.14 (asymptotic) 
    3.33 (finite-sample)  4.31 (finite-sample) 
 




Table 15: Long-run elasticities of jet fuel demand 
 
Sample period  Price elasticity (standard error)  Income elasticity (standard error) 




   




















































































































































































































































































































17Figure 3: Gasoline sales in South Africa and the real price of gasoline (95 octane, coast) (deflated 






Figure 4: Diesel sales in South Africa and the real price of diesel (0.005% sulphur) (deflated using the 
consumption expenditure deflator) 
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18Figure 5: Jet fuel sales in South Africa and the real price of jet fuel (Brent crude in Rand) (deflated 
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Figure 8: Recursive estimates for long-run price and income elasticity parameters in gasoline demand 
models (1982Q1-2010Q4) (initial sample size 40 data points) 
 
Ndn CHOWs       10% 







1.4 Ndn CHOWs       10% 
Petrol volume (lagged) ´ +/-2SE 





Petrol volume (lagged) ´ +/-2SE 
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Real disposable income (lagged) ´ +/-2SE 
Real petrol price (95 coast) (lagged) ´ +/-2SE 




Real petrol price (95 coast) (lagged) ´ +/-2SE 
20Figure 9: Recursive estimates for long-run income elasticity parameter in gasoline demand models 




Figure 10: Recursive Chow tests for parameter non-constancy in diesel model 
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21Figure 11: Recursive estimates for long-run income elasticity parameter in diesel fuel demand model 
(1998Q1-2010Q4) (initial sample size 40 data points) 
 
 
Figure 12: Recursive estimates for long-run income elasticity parameter in jet fuel demand models 
(1998Q1-2009Q3) (initial sample size 10 data points) 
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